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At least as long as I 
scholar of preternatural confidence.  While it could sometimes 
seem to be arrogance, especially in public settings, he possessed a 
sureness to his vision of quality scholarship that served 
light to a younger generation.  He arrived 
Communication Association (then the Speech Communication 
Association) in the mid
published in the Quarterly Journal of Speech
The Rhetoric of Science
in science mirrored the philosophers he had been working with 
informally at the University of Chicago and Northwestern 
University:  He was neither tentative nor defensive, but confidently 
internalist in his analyses.  A remarkable characteristic of this work, 
in retrospect, is how little time it spends making the case for a 
rhetorical approach to science.  The proof of the pudding is in the 
eating, they say, and most of the pieces meet the test
and insightful analysis. His analyses were marvels of hermeneutic 
practicality; his rhetorical apparatus was overall very classical, yet 
that vocabulary would expand in all sorts of unexpected directions 
as the situation demanded. 
The day before the beginning of the SCA conference in 1987, in 
Boston, a group of about twenty convened to talk about the rhetoric 
of inquiry and rhetorical epistemology
the institutionalization of AARST 
stands out for me about what we talked about in that session
need to get away from a “Philosophy 101” approach and start 
studying cases.  (T
epistemology.”)  The model for this study, all seemed to agree, were 
the sorts of case studies that Alan was writing. 
my second year out of graduate school, and at the break for lunch, 
Alan sought me out and asked me to eat with him and, flattered, I







have known him, Alan Gross has always been 
as a beacon 
at the National 
-1980s with the essays, many already 
, that would become 
 (Gross, 1990).  Alan’s approach to rhetoric 
 for exacting 
 
.  (This practice would lead to 
[now ARST] in 1993.)  One thing
: the
his was a direct swipe at “rhetorical 
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declared, in a matter-of-fact tone, “I can see you’re not stupid...”   
To this day, I’m not quite sure how I got into this category, but this 
turned out to be part of Alan's regular practice of expressing his 
disgust with what he felt was a reprehensible combination of 
timidity and superficiality in much of the scholarship on rhetoric 
and science.  (We have to remember that, at the time, there was 
precious little of it, so perhaps this was a bit ungenerous.)   I had 
been steeped in rhetorical epistemology in graduate school, but had 
never been very sympathetic to it.   I was energized by Alan's élan 
about a bold new direction and his disinclination to take a certain 
kind of defensive stance about rhetoric.  An example might be 
Michael McGee's and John Lyne’s contribution to the POROI 
Rhetoric in the Human Sciences conference from 1984 (entitled, 
"What Are Nice Folks Like You Doing in a Place Like This? Some 
Entailments of Treating Epistemic Claims Rhetorically" [McGee 
and Lyne, 1987]).  At the same time the POROI group was forging 
connections by allowing that scholars in many fields were (or could 
be) doing rhetoric of science, Alan felt little need for a big tent.  
At this group's meeting in 1991 (they would become the 
American Association for the Rhetoric of Science and Technology in 
1992 and just the Association for the Rhetoric of Science and 
Technology some years later), Dilip Gaonkar showed up and held 
forth in a somewhat disorganized but absolutely riveting style on 
some thoughts about rhetoric of science as it was then emerging.  I 
was tremendously excited by these ideas and I asked him where 
they were, or would be, published.  In characteristic fashion, he 
replied, “I don't know.  You should find me some place to publish.” 
I talked Keith Erickson, the editor of the Southern Speech 
Communication Journal, into giving me an issue, promising I 
would solicit very impressive essays for it.  Bafflingly, he trusted 
me.  Thus was born the special issue that led to the volume 
Rhetorical Hermeneutics: Invention and Interpretation in the Age 
of Science (Gross and Keith, 1996).  As I was about to approach 
presses, I felt the lightness of my years and CV, and decided I 
needed an éminence grise to co-edit the volume, and Alan 
immediately agreed.  Already the version of Gaonkar's essay in the 
special issue had aroused passionate responses, some of them quite 
negative.  Alan helped me see that we should feature the 
controversy, with all its pique, in the volume; hence, those who felt 
that Gaonkar's essay was an ill-natured attempt to rain on their 
rhetoric of science parade were well represented in the volume.  
Alan and I had long discussions about whether unrestrained snark 
was appropriate, but he was more likely to be worried about 
inelegant semicolons than insults.  
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At the end of the day, Alan Gross work was concerned with a 
certain notion of craft in scholarship: If you were going to do 
something, do it right, using whatever was necessary.  Many kinds 
of scholarship could be mobilized for rhetorical analysis, and he 
was fearless about plunging in and learning them.  From the history 
and philosophy of science, to story grammars, to cognitive 
psychology, Alan managed to connect many disciplines to rhetoric.  
Yet for the most part he sidestepped Gaonkar's charge, since he 
never claimed all these things somehow were rhetoric or rhetorical 
theory, but rather that they were bodies of knowledge of which 
rhetoric could fruitfully take account.  He employed theories and 
methods, rather than applying them, and this is a distinction with a 
difference.  Rather than showing the phenomenon in question as be 
restated in the vocabulary of a different theory, as is common in 
many tiresome pieces of scholarship ("A knee is a patella!"), Alan's 
approach to interdisciplinarity was functional.  These other fields 
were components in his analyses that, without translation, 
advanced his argument or set the stage for his argument.  Given 
what we know about psychology, or classical philosophy, or 
linguistics, what can rhetorical theory and analysis contribute?  
This still seems to me an entirely healthy and productive stance.   
At times, Alan’s quest for rigor could seem a bit like science 
envy, since those not keeping up with the latest developments in the 
social sciences might be dismissed out of hand.  But at his best, his 
work exemplified a high set of standards, an expectation that the 
worst scholarly sin is not being wrong, but being shallow or trivial.  
"Trivial" is an interesting term here.  It is really part of the 
philosopher's vocabulary.  Its origin is in logic and mathematics: 
Any assertion, implication, or proof that is tautologous or obvious 
(e.g. "How many divisors does a number have?  It's trivial that it 
has 1 and itself as divisors").  Restating one theory in another's 
terms is often trivial.  What is gained by doing that?  One can only 
be wrong if one ventures away from trivial claims ("rhetoric is 
persuasive") and into, so to speak, more empirical waters.  While 
his career in the rhetoric of science began with case studies, it 
moved in decidedly more empirical directions --away from 
generalizing to actually doing a content analysis of 300 years of 
scientific articles, for example.     
While Alan was never shy with his scorn for work he could not 
respect, he has been consistently a remarkably gentle and 
supportive teacher and colleague. Those who worked or studied 
with him held themselves to higher standards for having known 
him, and their work shows it.   
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